A new data set of on openness indicators and trade liberalization dates allows the 1995 Sachs and Warner study on the relationship between trade openness and economic growth to be extended to the 1990s. New evidence on the time paths of economic growth, physical capital investment, and openness around episodes of trade policy liberalization is also presented. Analysis based on the new data set suggests that over the 1950-98 period, countries that liberalized their trade regimes experienced average annual growth rates that were about 1.5 percentage points higher than before liberalization. Postliberalization investment rates rose 1.5-2.0 percentage points, confirming past findings that liberalization fosters growth in part through its effect on physical capital accumulation. Liberalization raised the average trade to GDP ratio by roughly 5 percentage points, suggesting that trade policy liberalization did indeed raise the actual level of openness of liberalizers. However, these average effects mask large differences across countries. 
The effect of this trend toward greater trade policy openness on per capita income growth is the topic of a large body of research. Until recently, a growing academic consensus had emerged that both trade policy openness and higher ratios of trade volumes to gross domestic product (GDP) were positively correlated with growth, even after controlling for a variety of other growth determinants. Attempts to establish a causal link also suggested a positive impact of trade.
2 In a sweeping critical survey of this literature, Rodríguez and Rodrik (2000) argue that these findings are less robust than claimed, because of difficulties in measuring openness, the statistical sensitivity of the specifications, the collinearity of protectionist policies with other bad policies, and other econometric difficulties. Further research on this important topic is called for in view of the doubts their study created about the linkages between trade openness and growth. 3 Taking over where Rodríguez and Rodrik (2000) left off, the article pursues three goals. The first goal is to update the Sachs-Warner classification by FIGURE 1. Openness to Trade, 1960 Openness is defined according to the Sachs and Warner (1995) criteria. Sample includes 141 countries.
Source: Authors' analysis based on data described in the text.
2. Particularly noteworthy are the contributions of Edwards (1992) , Dollar (1992) , Ben-David (1993) , Sachs and Warner (1995) , Ades and Glaeser (1999) , and Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg (2000) . Among studies trying to establish a causal link running from openness to growth or income levels, see Frankel and Romer (1999) , who measure openness by trade volumes, and Wacziarg (2001) , who captures openness by using a composite trade policy index.
3. Harrison and Hanson (1999) also criticize the Sachs-Warner classification, in a spirit similar to that of Rodríguez and Rodrik. Their criticisms are revisited in detail later in the article. presenting a comprehensive cross-country database of trade indicators (tariffs, nontariff barriers, and other measures of trade restrictions) and policy liberalization dates for the 1990s. The second goal is to extend the Sachs-Warner empirical results on outward orientation and growth to the 1990s. The third, and most important, goal is to exploit the timing of liberalization in a withincountry setting to identify the changes in growth, investment rates, and openness associated with discrete changes in trade policy.
The availability of almost 50 years of data makes it possible to compare the performance of countries under liberalized and nonliberalized regimes across time. The main empirical analysis presents estimates for the within-country response of per capita income growth, the investment rate, and the ratio of imports plus exports to GDP to trade liberalization, controlling for country and time effects. New evidence is presented on the within-country path of growth in relation to the date of major trade policy changes. Evidence from the large sample is supplemented by a discussion of several developing countries' experiences with trade reform.
The cross-sectional results confirm recent criticisms of the Sachs-Warner findings by showing that these were sensitive to the openness classification used in the 1970-89 period and do not hold for the 1990s. The vast majority of countries in the sample used here are classified as having been open during the 1990s; a simple dichotomous indicator of openness no longer discriminates between slow-and fast-growing countries. The findings here suggest that researchers should exercise caution when using simple dichotomous policy indicators such as the Sachs-Warner dummy variable. However, the dates of trade liberalization-collected by Sachs-Warner from a comprehensive survey of a broad country-specific case literature and updated here to the late 1990s-can be used to estimate the within-country growth and investment effects of trade policy liberalization. In contrast to the cross-sectional findings presented here, the results based on within-country variation suggest that over time the effects of increased policy openness within countries are positive, economically large, and statistically significant.
The article examines a subsample of developing countries for which detailed information was collected on the broader economic and political context of trade reform. It then interprets the large sample results in the context of these country case studies. This effort reveals two lessons. First, the extent to which per capita income growth changed after trade reforms varied widely across countries. While the average effect obtained in the large sample is positive, roughly half of the countries experienced zero or even negative changes in growth following liberalization. Second, generalizations about the factors that may explain these differences are difficult to draw. The institutional environment of countries, the extent of political turmoil, the scope and depth of economic reforms, and the characteristics of concurrent macroeconomic policies all seem to have a role to play, to varying degrees in different countries. While this article paints a picture that is highly favorable to outward-oriented policy reforms on average, it cautions against one-size-fits-all policies that disregard local circumstances.
The article is organized as follows. Section I presents an updated data set of liberalization dates and policy openness indicators and uses the data to replicate the Sachs-Warner growth regressions. Section II presents within-country evidence on trade liberalization, growth, investment, and trade volumes and discusses the timing of these effects. Section III examines 13 country cases of trade liberalization in order to illustrate the country-specific complexities that underlie the results from the larger sample. The last section provides some concluding remarks.
I . T R A D E L I B E R A L I Z A T I O N I N T H E 1 9 9 0 S
This section updates the Sachs-Warner classification and results. It also addresses the Rodríguez and Rodrik critique of their study.
The Sachs-Warner Criteria
An update of the Sachs-Warner classification is called for not only because of the problems with their classification of open and closed countries but also because the underlying data-on tariffs, nontariff barriers, exchange rate black market premia, socialist economic systems, and export marketing boards-are of independent interest. This section presents a comprehensive database of these variables for the 1990s. It also presents the results of a painstaking check of the Sachs-Warner classification of openness and updates their data on trade policy openness through 2000.
Sachs-Warner constructed a dummy variable for openness based on five individual dummy variables for specific trade-related policies. A country was classified as closed if it displayed at least one of the following characteristics:
(1) Average tariff rates of 40 percent of more (TAR).
(2) Nontariff barriers covering 40 percent or more of trade (NTB). (3) A black market exchange rate at least 20 percent lower than the official exchange rate (BMP). (4) A state monopoly on major exports (XMB). (5) A socialist economic system (as defined by Kornai 1992) 
(SOC).
Tariff and nontariff barriers restrict trade directly. A black market premium (BMP) on the exchange rate could have effects equivalent to formal trade restrictions. If, for example, exporters have to purchase foreign inputs using foreign currency obtained on the black market but remit their foreign exchange receipts from exports to the government at the official exchange rate, the BMP acts as a trade restriction. On the basis of Lerner symmetry between import tariffs and export taxes, Sachs-Warner also included the state monopoly on exports criterion as a trade restriction. The socialist regime dummy variable accounts for the trade-limiting aspects of centrally planned economies.
It is important to distinguish the Sachs-Warner dummy variable for openness, which pertains to the 1970s and 1980s, from the Sachs-Warner liberalization dates, which extend from 1950 to 1994 and were compiled independently using a different methodology. While the Sachs-Warner dummy variable was based on the five criteria cited above, the dates of liberalization were obtained from a comprehensive survey of country case studies of liberalization. Where possible, the criteria used to construct the cross-sectional dummy variable for the 1970s and 1980s were used to establish the date of liberalization. Data limitations and lack of consistency in the definitions of the available measures of trade restrictions across time periods, however, prevented Sachs-Warner from using their five criteria to establish the dates of liberalization.
4 The Sachs-Warner methodology was followed as closely as possible in the update presented here.
An Openness Dummy Variable for the 1990s
The sample is based on the 118 countries included in the Sachs-Warner data set. 5 The sample also includes the new data on 23 Eastern European countries and former Soviet republics included in version 6 of the Penn World Tables (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2002) . The openness dummy variable (OPEN90-99) was based on the five criteria Sachs-Warner use, in order to maintain as much consistency as possible between their data set and the data used here. Data limitations made it impossible to update their dummy variable to the 1990s based on exactly the same data, however.
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The main differences between the two data sets include the following:
(1) Because of data availability problems, unweighted tariff data were used here; Sachs-Warner used own import-weighted data. Countries that exceed the TAR threshold in the new data set based on unweighted data could conceivably not exceed the threshold based on weighted average data. This is unlikely to be a big problem, however, because the use of unweighted rather weighted tariffs does not result in countries being classified differently in the subsample in which both measures are available. (2) Nontariff barrier data comparable to those used by Sachs-Warner are hard to obtain. Sachs-Warner used average nontariff barrier data for 1985-88 from the Barro-Lee data set, itself based on data from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Their data cover only 29 countries for the period 1995-98. Where 4. As Sachs-Warner write (p. 24), "Our choice of dating is surely subject to further refinement. . .. We relied on a wide array of secondary sources, which sometimes contradicted each other." The appendix to their article describes how they compiled their dates of liberalization and identifies the corresponding data sources for each country in their sample. A similar appendix for the updated dates is available in the working paper version of this study (Wacziarg and Welch 2003) .
5. Sachs-Warner characterized the openness status of only 111 of these countries. 6. The data sources are detailed in Wacziarg and Welch 2003 . The full data set is available in electronic format at www.stanford.edu/~wacziarg/papersum.html. comparable data on nontariff barriers were missing, the countries were classified based only on the other four Sachs-Warner criteria. The limited availability of nontariff barrier data for the 1990s based on a consistent definition required the compilation of an additional nontariff barrier data set, which may be independently useful to researchers. In addition to the 1995-98 average core nontariff barrier data used in the analysis, the data set contains average core nontariff barrier data for 1989-94 and 1999 data for all nontariff barriers.
7
(3) Sachs-Warner relied on an export marketing index from a World Bank study of African countries (Husain and Faruqee 1994) as the basis for their XMB variables and on the Kornai (1992) classification of socialist countries as the basis for their SOC dummy variable. In the absence of updated indices from single sources, the same methodology could not be used with the updated data. The XMB and SOC dummy variables were therefore obtained from a comprehensive review of country case studies. The XMB criterion is no longer confined to African countries (as it was in Sachs-Warner), but applies to all countries in the updated data. The definition of an export marketing board was expanded to encompass any form of state monopoly over major exports.
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(4) Data on the BMP from Easterly and Sewadeh (2002) , the primary source for updating these data, are missing for Belarus, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, and only very limited data are available for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Moldova. All are classified as open based on the overall index drawing on limited data. Whenever BMP data were available for former Soviet republics, the data indicate that in 2001 all of these countries except Latvia and Lithuania were closed. (5) Sachs-Warner deviated in some cases from their self-imposed classification rules. Some adjustments were meant to capture the fact that some countries had undergone changes in trade policy only mid-period, so that a classification based on period averages could be misleading. Other adjustments were made for others' reasons, described in their article. Lacking objective reasons to deviate from stated rules, the updated classification presented here abstains from any such adjustments. 7. The difference in the definitions reflects the 1999 change in UNCTAD's reporting. Before 1999, UNCTAD collected data on core nontariff barriers, including quotas, licensing, prohibitions, and administered pricing. In 1999, it began reporting all nontariff barriers, which also include technical measures and automatic licensing.
8. Wacziarg and Welch (2003) provide additional details and country-specific sources on export marketing boards and the political transitions from socialism. Sachs-Warner in 1970-89 was classified as closed in the updated data set.
An important and often overlooked drawback of the Sachs-Warner openness dummy variable is that it is based on averages of BMP data over each of two decades (1970-79 and 1980-89) , averages of nontariff barriers and tariffs (TAR) over the last years of their sample period , and end-of-period data for the export marketing board (XMB) and socialist (SOC) dummy variables. In the new data set, the XMB and SOC variables are based on their 1999 values rather than beginning-of-period or decade-long data, in order to maintain as much consistency as possible with the Sachs-Warner methodology. 10 Similarly, the nontariff barrier data are available only for 1995-98; decade averages of the tariff data, which are available, are therefore used. As a result, some countries classified as closed could conceivably have become open late in the decade, and some countries classified as open could have been closed over most of the period. Decade dummy variables thus provide only a rough characterization of a country's outward orientation, especially in a decade in which many countries actively engaged in liberalization. A better approach is to rely more on liberalization dates, as is done below.
Trade Liberalization Dates since 1994
In principle, the liberalization date is the date after which all of the Sachs-Warner openness criteria are continuously met (data limitations often imposed reliance on country case studies of trade policy). The choice of liberalization dates was based on primary-source data on annual tariffs, nontariff barriers, and BMPs. A variety of secondary sources was also used, particularly to identify when export marketing boards were abolished and multiparty governance systems replaced Communist Party rule. Because of data limitations, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD 1994) classification and standards of 9. The other seven countries are Cape Verde, Iceland, Lesotho, Liberia, Malta, Panama, and Swaziland. Because of lack of data, Sachs-Warner did not classify these and four other countries (Comoros, Fiji, Seychelles, and Suriname). The new data set did not allow for the determination of the openness status of these four countries in the 1990s.
10. Sachs-Warner's XMB indicators are based on data from 1991; the SOC indicators are based on data from 1987. Using 1999 data is thus consistent with their approach, however questionable that approach may be. Most countries that abolished export marketing boards in the 1990s did so during the first half of the decade. However, relying on end-of-period SOC data means that some Eastern European countries and former Soviet republics are classified as open. openness were used for several transition economies, just as they are in Sachs-Warner. 
The Rodríguez and Rodrik Critique
Rodríguez and Rodrik (2000) find that the BMP and XMB variables played a major role in the classification of countries as open or closed. They state that a dummy variable for openness based on the BMP and XMB criteria alone leads to the classification of countries as open or closed that is much closer to that generated by OPEN (the Sachs-Warner dummy variable) than one based on the SOC, TAR, and NTB dummy variables alone. They show that the BMP and XMB criteria generate a dummy variable that differs from the Sachs-Warner dummy variable in only six cases, while the TAR, NTB, and SOC criteria used jointly generated a dummy variable that differs from the Sachs-Warner dummy variable in 31 cases. Hence, they argue that the Sachs-Warner dummy variable for 1970-89 largely reflected the BMP and XMB criteria. Moreover, they argue that the XMB criterion affected only the African countries (many of which were classified as closed based on this criterion alone) and therefore amounted to an Africa dummy variable. 14 11. The working paper version of this study (Wacziarg and Welch 2003) provides detailed country summaries of liberalization episodes, along with an explanation of the dates chosen.
12. Wacziarg and Wallack (2004) systematically checked the Sachs-Warner liberalization dates before 1990 in a subset of their sample, uncovering little disagreement.
13. Table 1 also presents data for Cape Verde and Panama, which were not classified in the Sachs-Warner study.
14. Sachs-Warner based the XMB criterion entirely on the Husain and Faruqee's (1994) study of African countries that had been involved in a World Bank or International Monetary Fund structural adjustment program between 1987 and 1991. Rodríguez and Rodrik (2000) noted that Sachs-Warner classify all but one of the Sub-Saharan African countries as closed based on the XMB criterion, which is not applied to any other region. This study gathered and used XMB data for countries other than African ones.
To what extent are the updated Sachs-Warner data subject to the Rodríguez and Rodrik critique? BMP was the sole criterion on the basis of which 26 of Sachs and Warner (1995) . Source: Authors' analysis based on data described in the text. 42 countries were classified as closed in the 1990s; XMB was the sole criterion on which nine countries were classified as closed. Three countries were classified as closed based on both the BMP and XMB criteria, leaving just four countries (Bangladesh, China, India, and Pakistan) classified as closed based on the other three criteria. Bangladesh was classified as closed based on both the TAR and BMP criteria. China was classified as closed based on the BMP and SOC criteria. India was classified as closed because of its tariff and nontariff barriers. Pakistan was classified as closed because of tariffs.
The BMP and XMB criteria generated a dummy variable that differs from the 1990-99 updated Sachs-Warner dummy variable in only two cases, while the TAR, NTB, and SOC criteria used jointly generate a dummy variable that differs from the updated Sachs-Warner dummy variable in 38 cases. 15 The openness status dummy variable for 1990-99 is thus subject to the same criticisms Rodríguez and Rodrik lodged against the Sachs-Warner classification for the 1970-89 openness dummy variable.
The Rodríguez and Rodrik critique is valid in terms of country status based on the OPEN90-99 dummy variable. It is less valid for the liberalization dates. As most countries were classified as closed based on the XMB and BMP criteria, not surprisingly, when they open up these variables change. The XMB and BMP variables determined the year of liberalization in many countries that opened up during the 1990s. The exceptions tend to be Eastern European countries and former Soviet republics, which opened based on the SOC criterion (general reforms related to liberalization). The TAR criterion was not a decisive factor in assigning a liberalization date for any country; NTB was the determining factor only in Panama. However, policy changes that reduced the BMP or removed XMBs were generally accompanied by changes in the levels of other types of trade barriers, such as tariff and nontariff barriers, that had initial values below the Sachs-Warner thresholds of 40 percent. Hence, liberalization dates do not simply capture changes in the BMP and XMB variables, but they also reflect broader liberalization. Given that the dates of liberalization in the new data set were cross-checked against a case study literature of outward-oriented reforms in developing countries, it is likely that they reflect important shifts in trade policy. 16 
Updating the Sachs-Warner Results
The Sachs-Warner study attracted considerable attention in part because their estimated effect of the cross-sectional dummy variable for openness in explaining annual growth between 1970 and 1989 was very large (about 2 percentage 15. Among the countries in which the TAR, NTB, and SOC dummy variables and the updated Sachs-Warner dummy variable disagree, 20 are in Africa and 10 are Eastern European countries or former Soviet republics. These countries were classified as closed based on either the XMB criterion or the BMP criterion, or both.
16. Wacziarg and Wallack (2004) show that the Sachs-Warner liberalization dates are good indicators of the timing of major trade policy changes by thoroughly checking these dates against the case study literature of trade liberalization in 25 developing countries. points). The updated data on trade policy openness make it possible to extend the Sachs-Warner regressions through the late 1990s. As this is not the main focus of this article, these results are reported only briefly.
As a consistency check, the Sachs-Warner regression was first replicated for 1970-89 (column 1 in table 3 replicates column 7 in Sachs-Warner's table 11). The only difference is that the new calculations are based on a newer release of the Penn World Tables data (version 6 instead of version 5). The openness dummy variable for 1970-89 enters highly significantly, with a magnitude of 1.98 percentage points of annual growth. This result is consistent with the results in Sachs-Warner, who find a coefficient of 2.2. In contrast, the updated Sachs-Warner dummy variable enters insignificantly in the same specification for the 1990s (column 2 of table 3).
The cross-sectional effect of openness on growth was estimated by constructing openness indicators based on the dates of liberalization. The openness status for 1980, for example, takes on a value of 1 if a country had liberalized by 1980 and a value of 0 otherwise. Subsequent growth (after 1980) can then be regressed on this variable and other controls. Dummy variables were constructed for each decade (1970, 1980, and 1989) in this fashion. An advantage of this method over the period-specific dummy variables is that the periodspecific dummy variables are based partly on information from the end of the period (TAR, NTB, XMB, and SOC) and partly on period averages (BMP). Constructing openness indicators based on the dates of liberalization instead isolates only the countries that were open at the beginning of a period.
The econometric specification is identical to that in Sachs-Warner; it restricts the time span of each regression to a single decade. The effect of the liberalization status in the 1970s is weaker and smaller than in the 1980s but positive and significant at the 90 percent level. The Sachs-Warner results were likely driven by the strong effect of liberalization on growth in the 1980s (columns 3 and 4 of table 3). This effect is positive but statistically indistinguishable from zero in the 1990s when countries are grouped according to their liberalization status as of 1989. These results suggest that the Sachs-Warner cross-sectional findings are highly sensitive to the decade under consideration and that the updated openness indicator can no longer effectively distinguish fast-growing from slow-growing countries.
I I . W I T H I N -C O U N T R Y L I B E R A L I Z A T I O N D Y N A M I C S
This section argues that better use can be made of data on the dates of liberalization. With almost 50 years of data on growth and openness, it is possible to 17. Wacziarg and Welch (2003) , who conduct many more replications of the initial Sachs-Warner cross-sectional findings, conclude that no matter how the liberalization dummy variable was defined, the results for the 1990s show an insignificant effect of the updated dummy variable on growth. This result is in sharp contrast with the results for the 1970-89 period. Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. The beginning date of each period (1970 in columns 1 and 3, 1980 in column 4, and 1989 in columns 2 and 5) is denoted by t. (t, t þ X) denotes the average computed between dates t and t þ X (X ¼ 20 in column 1 and 10 in columns 2 -5). The dependent variable is defined as the real annual per capita growth rate of GDP in the relevant period.
Source: Authors' analysis based on data described in the text. Growth, income, and investment data are from Heston, Summers and Aten (2002) . assess the within-country effects of discrete changes in trade policy openness.
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This section compares the means of economic growth and other variables of interest, such as physical capital investment rates and trade volumes, under liberalized and nonliberalized regimes.
Liberalization and Growth
Fixed-effects regressions of growth on a binary liberalization indicator, defined by the dates of liberalization, were run to assess the within-country effect of growth on liberalization. The regressions amount to difference regressions in growth or difference-in-difference regressions in log income:
where y it is per capita income in country i at time t and LIB it ¼ 1 if t is greater than the year of liberalization and no reversals of the trade policy reforms have occurred, and 0 otherwise. The sample was not restricted to countries that underwent reforms. The residual term is modeled as 1 it ¼ v i þ h t þ m it and in all regressions, the v i terms are treated as country fixed effects and h t terms as fixed effects.
Over the sample period 1950-98, 31.7 percent of country-year observations occur in a liberalized regime (LIB it ¼ 1) (table 4). The conditional mean of annual growth of per capita GDP given that a country is liberalized is 2.71 percent, while the mean is 1.18 percent in a nonliberalized regime, a difference of 1.53 percentage points of annual growth. These simple conditional means are based on both cross-sectional and within-country variation.
Panel (1) of table 5 displays country and time fixed-effects regressions of growth on the liberalization indicator, in order to isolate within-country variation. The regression for 1950-98 indicates a within-country difference in growth between a liberalized and a nonliberalized regime of 1.42 percentage points (column 1). This coefficient is estimated with a high level of statistical precision (the t-statistic exceeds 5). 19 The estimated within-country 18. Sachs and Warner provide some within-country evidence on liberalization and growth for a sample of 37 reformers, presenting estimates for one fixed-effects regression of growth on dummy variables for three time periods around liberalization episodes. They show that average growth was depressed by 0.88 percentage points in the three years before liberalization, rose 1.09 percentage points a year in the three years following liberalization, and rose 1.33 percentage points a year thereafter relative to growth in the three years before liberalization. These limited results are of the same order of magnitude as the more detailed research presented here, which investigates the robustness of these estimates, extends them in time (the sample period spans 1950-98 rather than 1966-93) and space (the sample includes up to 133 countries rather than 37), and presents new evidence on investment and openness.
19. This effect was estimated allowing for first-order autocorrelation of the residuals, using the Baltagi-Wu fixed-effects method. The coefficient on liberalization was 1.32, with a t-statistic of 4.14, in line with the fixed-effects results reported here. The simpler fixed-effects estimates, with t-statistics based on robust standard errors, are reported here because of concerns over the small T properties of the Baltagi-Wu estimator, particularly when the sample is restricted to specific decades. effect increases over time, reaching its maximum in the 1990s (column 2 -4). These results stand in sharp contrast to the cross-sectional results: countries that liberalized in the 1990s experienced a larger postliberalization increase in growth than countries that liberalized in any other decade. Indeed, the estimated difference in growth in the 1990s is roughly 2.55 percentage points. Note: Numbers in parentheses are robust t-statistics. Regressions are based on the specifications in equations (1) -(3).All regressions include time and country fixed-effects (estimates not reported).
Source: Authors' analysis based on data described in the text. Source: Authors' analysis based on data described in the text.
Liberalization and Investment
The empirical literature on trade and growth suggests that the effects of liberalization on economic growth are mediated largely by the rate of physical capital investment. Several researchers, including Levine and Renelt (1992) , Baldwin and Seghezza (1996) , and Wacziarg (2001) , suggest that the investment rate is an important channel linking trade and growth. This finding is based largely on cross-country findings. Fixed-effects regressions of investment rates on the liberalization indicator were run in order to investigate this issue in a withincountry context:
where I it is physical capital investment and Y it is GDP in country i at time t, and v it captures country and year effects.
Panel (2) of table 5 reports the estimates of such regressions. The withincountry evidence confirms past cross-country findings. For the period 1950-98, countries with liberalized regimes experienced average rates of physical capital investment that were 1.94 percentage points higher than those of countries with nonliberalized regimes. This represents 20 percent of this variable's standard deviation in the pooled sample. The effect is largest in the initial period of the sample .
Fixed-effects regressions of growth on the investment rate were run in order to get a rough notion of how much of the effect of trade policy openness on growth can be attributed to the investment channel. The coefficient on investment in the baseline 1950-98 regression was 0.15 percentage points, with a t-statistic of 8.05. 20 The effect of liberalization on investment in the corresponding regression was 1.94 percentage points. Multiplying the two yields an estimate of the effect of liberalization on growth through investment of roughly 0.29 percentage points, about 21 percent of the total effect of liberalization on growth. The analysis provides suggestive evidence that investment constitutes an important channel through which trade-centered liberalization affects growth within countries.
Liberalization and Openness
Is trade policy liberalization followed by a break in the volume of trade, as measured by the ratio of imports plus exports to GDP? If this is the case, it suggests that liberalization did increase the level of openness of the economy. Determining this effect is important, because announced reforms may be poorly implemented or counteracted by alternative trade barriers. If trade liberalization is associated 20. The full results are presented in the working paper version of this study (Wacziarg and Welch 2003) .
with increases in trade volumes, one could be more confident that it actually raised the level of exposure of the reforming country to the world economy.
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This issue is examined by running the following regression:
where X it denotes exports and M it denotes imports. The results suggest that liberalization raises openness by 5.53 percentage points of GDP for the full sample period (Panel (3) of table 5). This effect is indistinguishable from zero in the 1990-98 time period, however, perhaps because more time is needed to observe the effects of recent liberalizations on trade volumes. In most periods, however, trade liberalization is associated with sustained and large increases in the effective level of exposure of the typical reforming country to the world economy.
Timing of Effects
The simple average difference between growth in nonliberalized and liberalized regimes may mask important timing issues. It provides no information on how soon the effects occur or whether they cease to be felt a few years after reform. This subsection examines the time path of growth, investment, and openness for an average country before and after liberalization.
Average annual growth rates, investment rates, and openness ratios are displayed in figures 2 through 4 for 20 years before and 20 years after liberalization in a sample of 81 countries that underwent permanent liberalizations (that is, liberalizations that were not reversed as of 2000). As several countries had varying numbers of years of data before and after their liberalization, the average at each point in time is based on different samples of countries.
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Several observations can be made about the figures. First, despite not controlling for any fixed effects, the increase in growth following liberalization is remarkably similar to that shown in table 5: growth before trade-centered reforms averages 1.5 percent and rises to roughly 3 percent postreform (figure 2). Second, there does not seem to be a strong time pattern: the effects appear to be immediate and do not die out after a few years. Third, the few years immediately preceding liberalization are low-growth years: reforms are often preceded by downturns or crises.
The investment rate seems to take off during the 10 years following liberalization and remain high thereafter (figure 3). The plotted effect seems larger than that uncovered in the fixed-effects regressions. Openness follows a more or less 21. Even absent effects on actual openness, liberalization could still have effects on growth and investment, through pro-competitive effects or technological transfers, for example.
22. The figures did not look different when the sample was restricted to countries with continuously available data. The availability of data forced a reduction in the time span to eight years before and after liberalizations and in the country coverage to 39 countries. These figures are available in the working paper version of this study (Wacziarg and Welch 2003) . linear upward trend, without an apparent break at the date of liberalization (figure 4). More formal tests based on fixed effects did reveal an effect attributable to liberalization, even after controlling for time fixed effects, however.
Dummy variables for four (nonoverlapping) periods surrounding the reforms were defined in order to further examine the timing of the growth, investment, and openness responses to liberalization. Fixed-effects regressions were then run on growth, investment, and openness. The specification is as follows:
where D 1it ¼ 1 if T 2 3 t T 2 1 and zero otherwise;
, and D 4it ¼ 1 if t . T þ 6; and T denotes the date of liberalization. The coefficients on these dummy variables capture the average difference in growth between these years and the period preceding three years before liberalization (the baseline period). The corresponding specifications for the investment rate and openness ratio were also run (table 6).
FIGURE 2. Sample Means for Growth before and after Liberalization
23. Countries that experienced policy reversals or multiple liberalizations, for which definitions of the dummy variables are not straightforward, had to be dropped. Dropping these variables reduced the size of the sample for the growth regression from 133 to 118 countries.
The results are consistent with the observations made about figures 2 -4. Countries that liberalize often do so following periods of economic turmoil: growth is depressed by 0.55 percentage points in the three years before liberalization relative to the preceding years. Tornell (1998) shows that 60 percent of episodes of economic reform, including trade reform, occur in the aftermath of a domestic political or economic crisis. Measuring growth differences relative to "early prereform" outcomes prevents falsely attributing to reforms growth differences that stem from depressed economic circumstances in the years immediately preceding the reforms. In the three years following liberalization, growth rises slightly (by 0.30 percentage points), but the effect is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Sustained growth differences become apparent three years after reform, with annual increases in growth of 1.44 points in period T þ 3 to T þ 6 and of 1.0 percentage point after that relative to the baseline period. The typical timing pattern revealed by these regressions shows growth to be slightly depressed before liberalization and to increase 1.0-1.5 percentage points three years after reforms. A similar pattern applies to investment and openness. These estimates reflect sample averages and may mask interesting country-specific differences, as discussed below. Note: Number in parentheses are robust-statistics. Regressions are based on the specification in equation (4). All regressions include time and country fixed-effects (estimates not reported). Definition of dummy variables, where T represents the date of liberalization, is as follows: D 1 ¼ 1 if T 2 3 t T 2 1 and zero otherwise. D 2 ¼ 1 if T t T þ 2 and zero otherwise. D 3 ¼ 1 if T þ 3 t T þ 6 and zero otherwise. D 4 ¼ 1 if t . T þ 6 and zero otherwise.
Concurrent Policies
It is difficult to attribute differences in growth purely to trade liberalization. Countries carrying out trade reforms often simultaneously adopt policies favoring domestic deregulation, privatization, and other microeconomic reforms and macroeconomic adjustments, making it difficult to interpret the coefficient on liberalization in a within-country growth regression as the total effect of trade liberalization per se. 24 A more realistic interpretation of these estimates is that they capture the impact of trade-centered reforms more broadly. In what follows, we describe our efforts to address this important concern. SCOPE OF REFORMS. The working paper version of this study (Wacziarg and Welch 2003) distinguishes countries that carried out overall reforms from those that carried out external sector reforms in relative isolation from other domestic reforms. Wacziarg and Wallack (2004) examine 22 episodes of trade liberalization, most of them in developing countries in the 1980s. Fourteen of these episodes were accompanied by market-oriented domestic reforms; eight occurred in relative isolation from major shifts in domestic policy. The distinction between pure trade reforms and overall reforms was based largely on whether the countries implemented a substantial program of privatization and deregulation at the same time as trade reforms. Isolating the sample of countries that were part of the Wacziarg and Wallack (2004) study and examining whether the within-country effects of liberalization on growth differed between trade reformers and overall reformers reveal several noteworthy findings. First, even though the sample was restricted to 22 countries, the estimates were remarkably similar to those obtained for the full sample of 133 countries. Second, the estimates of the impact of trade liberalization in countries that carried out trade reforms in isolation were similar to the corresponding estimates for countries that also reformed their domestic sectors, despite the crude nature of the distinction between overall reformers and pure trade reformers. While the interpretation of these suggestive results requires caution, a plausible conclusion is that the effect of trade-centered reforms is in large part attributable to an external reform component. This issue is further addressed below in the context of individual country experiences.
OTHER EXTERNAL REFORMS. Trade reforms are sometimes associated with other types of external reforms, such as capital market liberalization. To the extent such reforms are adopted simultaneously, estimates may capture the impact of these financial reforms rather than trade reforms. This argument is frequently invoked to criticize the type of estimates presented above.
24. An analogous point is often made in a cross-country context. Rodríguez and Rodrik (2000) and other observers suggest that "bad" government policies tend to go together, making it difficult to disentangle the effects of protectionist trade policy from those of poor macroeconomic management, poor governance, or poor institutions in general. This issue is investigated by looking at data on the timing of financial reforms. Bekaert, Harvey, and Lunblad (2001) examine the impact of capital market liberalization on economic growth in a panel context, using both cross-sectional and within-country time variation. Using data from Bekaert and Harvey (2000) on the dates of official regulatory reforms pertaining to financial markets, they find robust positive effects of financial liberalization.
25 Their dates are compared with the dates of trade liberalization in the data set used here. Bekaert and Harvey (2000) characterize the date of official financial liberalization for 40 of the 106 countries in the sample that had liberalized by 2001.
26
Of these, only two (Brazil and Turkey) have exactly the same year of official financial regulatory reform and trade liberalization. Only nine countries implemented financial sector reforms within three years before and after the date of trade liberalization, and just 17 did so within five years before and after. Many countries that enacted trade reforms never enacted financial liberalization, so the numbers cited above overstate the extent of coincidence between financial and trade liberalization dates. There is thus little evidence that trade reform and financial market liberalization occur concurrently and that the estimates may confound the effects of the two types of reform.
I I I . C O U N T R Y C A S E S T U D I E S
The econometric results presented above summarize the effect of trade liberalization on growth and other variables for a sample of very diverse countries. Fixed-effects regressions allow all time-invariant country characteristics to be controlled for. The estimated coefficients on liberalization are not countryspecific, however; they represent average responses. The reaction of individual countries to reforms is likely to vary, especially as the depth and scope of reforms differed across countries.
Much can be learned from the considerable heterogeneity in the response of growth to trade reform. This section examines specific cases of reform in countries representative of the broader sample for which enough data on growth, investment, and openness are available before and after reforms. The goal is to get a sense of the subtleties of reform in specific cases and to illustrate the economic mechanisms that give rise to the average estimated effects. The time paths of growth, investment, and openness are first examined for a subsample of 24 developing countries for which data are available for at least eight years before and after liberalization. A more detailed discussion then focuses on 13 of these countries. 25 . Henry (1999 Henry ( , 2000 uses data on economic and political reforms for a smaller set of 18 developing countries.
26. Details of the comparison between the Bekaert and Harvey (2000) dates and the dates presented here are available on request.
The average difference in growth, investment rates, and openness ratios between the pre-and postliberalization periods is shown for 24 countries (table 7) . The countries were chosen from the sample of 39 countries for which at least eight years of data are available on either side of the date of liberalization, restricting the sample to emerging markets, the main focus of this study. The data reveal positive growth differences in 13 of the 24 countries and negative differences in six of them; the remaining five countries exhibit an effect close to zero. Postliberalization growth effects appear large in Mauritius, Indonesia, Uruguay, Republic of Korea, Chile, Taiwan (China), and Uganda. Among countries that experienced positive differences, the magnitude of the growth increase ranged from 0.83 percentage points of per capita income growth in Poland to 3.62 points in Mauritius. The range of growth decline was of a similar magnitude.
Before and after comparisons of investment rates and openness also reveal large variations across countries. The postliberalization surge in investment rates was particularly strong in the Republic of Korea, Taiwan (China), Indonesia, Jordan, and Guinea-Bissau. About half of the 24 countries exhibited zero or negative differences in investment rates. Source: Authors' analysis based on data described in the text.
Closer examination of postliberalization changes in growth, investment, and openness for a restricted sample of developing countries thus reveals considerable heterogeneity in their experiences with reform. The following case studies develop hypotheses that could account for these differences.
From the sample of 24 developing countries for which there are at least eight years of data on either side of liberalization, a subsample of 13 countries was selected to study in greater detail. A set of countries was chosen that was small enough to allow their preexisting conditions, overall policy environment, and macroeconomic circumstances to be examined while maintaining a geographically diverse sample reflecting the range of country-specific growth effects identified above. The goal was to uncover patterns that could explain cross-country differences in individual countries' responses to liberalization and suggest directions for future research.
The subsample was selected to include a geographically diverse set of countries that experienced growth effects of liberalization in roughly the same proportions as the 24 countries discussed above. It includes 13 countries, seven of which experienced higher mean growth rates following liberalization (Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Chile, Taiwan (China), Uganda, Ghana, and Poland). The growth difference was negative in four countries (Israel, Botswana, Mexico, and Hungary). In two countries, Colombia and the Philippines, liberalization was associated with roughly zero difference in their mean growth rates. Table A-3 describes all countries' concurrent reforms, macroeconomic environment, and political context. Examination of these case studies suggests that the packaging and timing of reforms are important factors in explaining differences in postliberalization growth patterns. Countries that followed through by deepening trade reforms over time did better than countries that did not. Neither active governmental disengagement from industrial policy nor broad-based reforms were necessary conditions for success. Countries that counteracted shortlived programs of external liberalization with domestic interventions and countries that adopted tight macroeconomic policies, faced unfavorable terms of trade shocks, or suffered from political instability did not perform as well as other countries.
Sustained Reforms
In the majority of countries that experienced higher growth following liberalization, trade reforms were not strictly limited to the period of liberalization; these countries continued to deepen trade reform after liberalization. Chile, for example, which liberalized in 1976, recovered from the Latin American debt crisis and continued to grow during the late 1980s. During this period, it decreased tariffs and implemented several bilateral free trade agreements. Both Korea and Taiwan (China), which liberalized in the 1960s, continued to lower tariffs and remove nontariff barriers, particularly during the mid-1980s and 1990s. Indonesia sustained the initial reforms of 1970 with reductions in export duties in 1976 and additional trade-centered liberalization throughout the 1980s. In Uganda, the 1988 liberalization was followed by a second wave of external reforms in 1993-94.
Scope of Reforms
Whether trade reforms were part of a package of other domestic reforms or occurred in relative isolation does not seem to help predict the effect on growth. Among countries that implemented broad-based reforms, and in which postliberalization growth increased, Chile and Poland stand out as prototypical success stories of reform. Both implemented broad-based domestic reforms, of which trade liberalization was only a part. In Colombia, Hungary, and Mexico, which Wacziarg and Wallack (2004) classify as broad-based reformers, average growth following liberalization actually fell. Political instability is probably at the heart of Colombia's lack of increased growth. In Hungary, the decline may have occurred because the domestic portion of the reform program (banking sector reforms, privatizations) was in large measure delayed until 1995. To the extent that external and domestic reforms are complementary, the full effects for Hungary may not be apparent in the growth data, which extend only to 1998.
The case of Mexico is more complex. The privatization program began before trade liberalization, in 1984, with the sale of small-and medium-sized businesses, and continued after 1986, with the sale of larger enterprises, such as the national telephone company, parts of the banking industry, and the national airline. While Mexico maintained large government oligopolies that prevented broad industrial restructuring and resource reallocation, one can hardly argue that its entry into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1986 and the concurrent reduction in external barriers occurred in isolation from other domestic reforms.
The flip side of this coin is a country like Ghana, which, according to Wacziarg and Wallack (2004) , implemented trade reforms in relative isolation (privatization, for instance, did not begin until the early to mid-1990s). It experienced a 2 percentage point increase in mean growth after the 1985 liberalization.
Other interesting cases are the success stories of Southeast Asia, where many economies, including Korea and Taiwan (China), implemented policies aimed at increasing foreign direct investment (FDI) at the same time or after external liberalization. Indonesia, Korea, and Taiwan (China) pursued growth strategies with widespread government involvement in the economy. In Indonesia, government involvement increased during the 1970s, after external liberalization began. Both Korea and Taiwan (China) adopted activist industrial policies, with the government involved in "picking winners." That the growth performance of these countries was unprecedented the 1998 Asian crisis shows that government disengagement from the economy is not a necessary condition for successful trade reforms. What all these countries shared was an outward-oriented development model in which increasing exports was a central pillar of the growth strategy.
One cannot point to the breadth of reform as an unambiguous criterion explaining differences in the growth response to liberalization. The picture that emerges is far from simple. The set of economies that experienced higher growth following liberalization includes both those that maintained heavy government involvement in the economy (Indonesia, Korea, and Taiwan [China] ) and those that actively reduced the role of government (Chile and Poland). The set of countries that experienced negative or zero growth differentials after liberalization includes Colombia, Hungary, and Mexico, countries that actively disengaged the government from domestic economic activity at the time of trade reforms.
Counteractive Policies
Some of the 13 countries in the sample implemented policies that actively counteracted the effects of trade reform and as a result did not experience increases in growth rates. 27 In Israel, social pacts based on broad coalitions of labor, government, and industry set the patterns for prices, wages, and the exchange rate in ways that mitigated the effects of trade openness on domestic producers. In the Philippines, trade liberalization was accompanied by a large increase in the share of state-owned enterprises in the economy, including a doubling of the share in GDP of financial transfers from the government to state-owned enterprises between 1987 and 1989. Such interventions, designed partly to protect domestic producers in the face of increased import competition, may have precluded the realization of gains from trade.
Macroeconomic Factors
Countries that did not experience growth increases after liberalization often suffered from mitigating circumstances, associated in particular with restrictive macroeconomic policies or terms of trade shocks. In Hungary and Mexico, two countries in which growth fell following liberalization, trade reform was followed by tight monetary policies involving high interest rates, which depressed growth. In Mexico, currency overvaluation undid the effects of trade liberalization in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
In Botswana, terms of trade considerations account for the absence of a postliberalization growth surge. Volatility on world diamond markets increased shortly after Botswana implemented trade reforms in 1979. The weak diamond marked caused a recession in 1981-82 that resulted in a postliberalization growth rate that was about 2 percentage points lower than the preliberalization rate. Thus, terms of trade considerations are essential in accounting for the absence of a postliberalization growth surge in Botswana.
27. Wacziarg and Wallack (2004) discuss some of these cases in greater detail.
Political Instability
Several countries suffered from severe forms of political instability, preventing realization of the gains from trade liberalization. A prime example is Colombia, where instability persisted throughout the 1990s. Other examples include Israel and the Philippines. In contrast, economies that seem to have experienced higher growth following reform also witnessed periods of relative political stability. Taiwan (China) is a case in point, as are Chile, Indonesia, and Korea, where liberalization coincided roughly with the rise to power of authoritarian regimes, resulting in a degree of lasting political stability following periods of political unrest.
I V. C O N C L U S I O N
This article presents an updated data set of trade policy indicators and liberalization dates. It revisits the evidence on the cross-country effects of Sachs-Warner's simple dichotomous indicator of outward orientation on economic growth, confirming the pitfalls of this indicator first identified by Rodríguez and Rodrik (2000) . It shows that the Sachs-Warner dichotomous indicator effectively separates fast-growing from slow-growing countries in the 1980s and to a lesser extent in the 1970s, but fails to do so in the 1990s. Simple dichotomous indicators of outward orientation are too crude to capture the complexities of trade policy.
Instead, liberalization dates that capture episodes of discrete shifts in trade policy can be useful for estimating within-country growth responses The Sachs-Warner dates of liberalization were painstakingly checked and updated, based on quantitative data and a thorough review of country-specific case studies of reform. The new and robust evidence indicates that these dates of liberalization mark breaks in growth, investment, and openness within countries. Over the 1950-98 period, countries that liberalized their trade regimes experienced average annual growth rates that were about 1.5 percentage points higher than before liberalization. Postliberalization investment rates rose 1.5-2.0 percentage points, confirming past findings that liberalization fosters growth in part through its effect on physical capital accumulation. Liberalization raised the average trade to GDP ratio by roughly 5 percentage points, after controlling for year effects, suggesting that trade policy liberalization did indeed raise the actual level of openness of liberalizers. Trade-centered reforms thus have significant effects on economic growth within countries.
These within-country estimates represent the average effect of liberalization on growth, investment, and openness; they mask differences in the individual responses of countries to trade liberalization. Restricting the sample to 13 countries sheds light on the sources of these differences. Countries that experienced positive effects tended to deepen trade reforms. But active industrial policies, such as those implemented in Southeast Asia, did not preclude growth gains from trade liberalization, and broad-based reforms appear to be neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for reaping these gains. Countries that experienced negative or no effects on growth tended to have suffered from political instability, adopted contractionary macroeconomic policies in the aftermath of reforms, or undertaken efforts to counteract trade reform by shielding domestic sectors from necessary adjustments. Future research should seek to clarify the factors accounting for heterogeneity in the growth effects of trade reform. Easterly and Sewadeh (2002) .
e Based on literature reviews; see Wacziarg and Welch (2003) for details.
Source: Author compilation. Colombia (1986) 1951-98 In December 1990, Colombia was unable to repay its debt principal payments; it was unable to refinance its debt until April 1991. In the wake of this crisis, Colombia pursued a variety of market-oriented reforms in addition to further trade liberalization. Price controls were lifted, a financial sector reform was implemented, the exchange control system was liberalized, the regulatory framework was modernized, and some industries were privatized (Wacziarg and Wallack 2004) . Throughout the 1990s, substantial trade reforms were implemented, including bilateral trade agreements with other Latin American countries in 1993/94 (Henry 1999) . The rise in civil unrest beginning in 1992 and the political instability that persisted throughout the 1990s likely limiting postliberalization economic growth.
(Continued ) (Henry 1999) . Mexico also pursued a privatization program during the 1980s, which continued into the 1990s, with the privatization of the banking industry (Henry 1999; Wacziarg and Wallack 2004 ). An economic and fiscal crisis occurred again in 1994-95.
It was accompanied by a period of political unrest, including the Chiapas uprising and the assassination of several PRI figures (Henry 1999) . In December 1994, Mexico devalued the peso and implemented a floating exchange rate regime. In 1995, it received a bailout, which prevented it from defaulting on its debt and granted it continued access to international capital markets (Tornell 2002) . Despite the economic recovery and trade liberalization that occurred in the late 1980s, Mexico never recovered to its precrisis levels of growth. The persisting macroeconomic instability and lack of additional structural reforms appear to have been key factors in limiting the gains from trade liberalization by preventing economic restructuring and reallocation of resources. According to the IMF (1999), further banking sector reforms and continued economic restructuring were necessary to sustain economic growth. The macroeconomic environment was hindered by the volatile price of oil, uncertainty regarding debt negotiations, and speculative attacks on the peso. As the government decreased expenditure under the structural adjustment program, domestic demand fell. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the currency became overvalued again, effectively offsetting trade liberalization measures. Nontrade barriers to competition also existed, in the form of government monopolies and oligopolies, which limited restructuring. The high interest rate, aimed at preventing speculative attacks and attracting foreign capital, limited domestic demand and restructuring (Gonzalez 1994) .The economy improved between 1995 and 1998 as a result of the implementation of structural reforms and the success of the floating exchange rate in mitigating the effect of external shocks (IMF 1999).
(Continued ) and 1979, when they were set at a uniform rate of 10 percent. In 1979, the exchange rate was fixed to the U.S. dollar, capital controls reduced, the tax system simplified, and privatization pursued (Stallings and Brock 1993) . Trade reform in the early years of the pro-market Pinochet administration was accompanied by privatization, elimination of the fiscal deficit, and the lifting of price and interest rate controls. Liberalization of the labor market also facilitated overall economic restructuring (Wacziarg and Wallack 2004) . In 1980/81, Chile privatized its social security system and implemented banking reforms. It experienced an economic crisis during the Latin American debt crisis, during which it was unable to access credit markets and the government assumed control of troubled banks. In 1982, GDP fell 14 percent and inflation doubled. Between 1982 and 1985, the peso was devalued, tariff rates were raised to 35 percent, and privatization efforts were reversed (Stallings and Brock 1993) . In 1985, the peso was gradually depreciated with a crawling peg, tariffs were reduced to 15 percent, and privatization resumed. During the mid-to late-1980s, Chile decreased tariffs, rescheduled its debt, and reprivatized the banking sector. During the 1990s, it signed free trade agreements with Colombia and Mexico and engaged in substantial capital market liberalization (Henry 1999 February 1976, the government reduced the 10 percent export duty on a wide range of commodities. During the 1970s, government intervention increased despite the implementation of trade liberalization reforms. The government increased its control of state-owned banks and other enterprises. Oil revenue was significant during the 1970s; economic growth weakened in the early 1980s, partly as a result of falling oil prices. However, the impact was mitigated by the country's rapid adjustment and a relatively low debt burden (Temple 2003) . In June 1983, the government announced a series of bank liberalization reforms, followed by further reforms in 1988 when credit subsidies were removed (Temple 2003) . Devaluations occurred in 1983 and 1986.
(Continued ) (Haggard, Cooper, and Moon 1993) . Korea transitioned from a policy of import substitution to export-oriented growth during the mid-1960s. Tariffs and nontariff barriers were reduced, and the government created export-processing zones and adopted other mechanisms for increasing FDI (Sakurai 1995) . The currency was devalued, the tax system and interest rates reformed, and capital markets liberalized. In 1965, the Export Development Committee was established; in 1966, quantitative restrictions were eliminated. Liberalization was not universal, however; certain sectors remained protected, and government involvement in the economy remained pervasive. The assassination of President Chung-Hee Park in November 1979 unleashed a year of political and economic crisis. In 1980, significant banking reforms were announced; in 1981, a five-year economic plan of structural adjustment was initiated. Economic growth was dampened during the Asia financial crisis of 1982-84.
(Continued ) (Amvouna 1998) .
Source: Author compilation.
